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The implementation of the third energy package has led to the enactment of various consti-
tutional provisions, which can be understood as the development of regulatory constitution-
al law. The incoherent and inconsistent approach towards a constitutional law for regulato-
ry authorities has created different constitutional challenges, eg regarding the democratic
concept of the constitution. Moreover, a shift from administrative authorities towards Euro-
pean-style agencies can be observed. This article highlights the findings of a study on regu-
latory aspects, ‘REGULATIE’, commissioned by the Austrian Chamber of Labour
(http://wien.arbeiterkammer.at/interessenvertretung).
I. The Constitutional Concept of
Austrian Administration
In Austria, the executive board of E-Control Austria,
which is the central body of the Austrian energy reg-
ulator, is appointed by the Federal Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs. According to the relevant Austrian law
(the E-Control Act1), a hearing takes place prior to the
appointment in the Austrian parliamentary commit-
tee responsible. At first sight, this provision does not
seem unusual. On the contrary, it guarantees a certain
legitimacy of the energy regulator. The particularity
of this obligatory hearing is that it is enacted on the
basis of a constitutional provision.2 Hence, the details
of the appointment to the Austrian energy regulator
form part of the Austrian Constitution. This provision
is just one example of various rules in which the con-
stitution itself determines particular issues regarding
the organisation of network regulations in Austria. For
the purposes of the present case note, this kind of le-
gal development is subsumed under the notion of ‘reg-
ulatory constitutional law’.
The reason for this rather unusual legal method
of implementing European regulatory directives re-
lates to the Austrian constitutional concept of ad-
ministration and its legitimacy. Based on the Consti-
tution of 1920, Austrian administration follows a hi-
erarchical scheme, which gives the Government
strong powers to control the whole administration.3
Independent administrative authoritieswere always
the exception. The accession to the European Union
in 1995 and the following implementation of the ac-
quis led not only to the liberalisation of network in-
dustries in Austria, but also had a major impact on
the democratic concept of administration in gener-
al.
The following report will focus on the impact of
the implementation of the EU’s third energy pack-
age, in particular on regulatory constitutional law
and its implications for the Austrian constitution as
well as for regulatory law in the energy sector. The
* Priv.-Doz. Dr. Konrad Lachmayer is an independent researcher in
Vienna. He holds a research chair at the Institute of Legal Studies,
Centre for Social Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
and is a senior lecturer (Privatdozent) in the Department of Con-
stitutional and Administrative Law at the University of Vienna –
Faculty of Law (www.lachmayer.eu; konrad@lachmayer.eu). This
report is based on a research project which was funded by the
Austrian Chamber of Workers and dealt with the legal analysis of
democratic deficits in the Austrian regulatory regimes regarding
energy and telecommunication regulation. The study “REGU-
LATIE” is to be found at <http://wien.arbeiterkammer.at/inter-
essenvertretung>.
1 Bundesgesetz über die Regulierungsbehörde in der Elektrizitäts-
und Erdgaswirtschaft, StF: BGBl. I Nr. 110/2010 (‘E-Control Act’).
2 ibid, Article 6, para 6.
3 Manfred Stelzer, The Constitution of the Republic of Austria. A
Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2011), 127.
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reportwill narrowdown the topic in three steps: first,
it will focus on the implementation of the EU’s third
energy package on theAustrian constitution, second,
the change of the administrative system will be
analysed, and third, the implications forAustrianand
Europeandemocracywill be illustrated. Finally, some
lessons can be learned from the Austrian example
for the European regulatory approach.
II. The Impact of Implementation
To understand the conceptual impact of European
regulatory law on Austrian constitutional law, one
has to be aware of two important characteristics of
the latter. First,Austrian constitutional law isnot cod-
ified in one document, but consists – besides a core
constitutional document, which is the Federal Con-
stitutional Act from 1920 – of several constitutional
acts, or rather constitutional provisions, which are
included in statutory law, and of international
treaties, which have constitutional rank. Second,
Austrian constitutional law is regularly amendedand
changed by the governmentwith the consent of a 2/3
parliamentary majority.4 The consequence of these
two characteristics is a very dynamic constitution,
which includes several provisions determining even
administrative law in certain details.
Asmentioned above, the European concept of reg-
ulatory law did not fit into the Austrian concept of
administrative law. Being based on a hierarchical ap-
proach, Austrian administration had to be re-adjust-
ed to enable the implementation. In 2008, the possi-
bility of establishing independent administrative
bodies was broadened and the concept of parliamen-
tary review of these independent bodies was en-
forced.5 These attempts at adjustment have proven
to be insufficient.
The implementationof theEU’s third energypack-
age6 led to the reorganisation of regulatory authori-
ties in Austrian energy law.7 Before the adoption of
the new concept, the Austrian regulatory concept
consisted of a state-based, though independent, reg-
ulatory committee and an auxiliary body, which was
organised as a state-owned private corporation.8 The
implementation of the EU's third energy package led
to a new organisational framework of the regulatory
authorities in energy law. A legal entity - E-Control
Austria - consisting of an executive board, a commis-
sion and a supervisory board was established under
public law. This entity is, as a regulating authority,
independent.9
The new regulatory concept did not fit into the
constitutional framework. In the traditional Austri-
an manner, the legislator enacted a number of con-
stitutional provisions to give the new concept a con-
stitutional foundation. The existing regulatory con-
stitutional law was extended and became even more
fragmented.
Two major problems arose from this solution:
First, the new conceptwas only implemented regard-
ing energy law without taking all other kinds of net-
work regulation into consideration: TheAustrian ap-
proach towards regulation lacks a comprehensive ap-
proach and each sector is conceptualised in a differ-
entmannerwith no coherent structure as regards the
constitutional framework. This leads not only to an
increasing enactment of constitutional provisions
but also to increased constitutional inconsistencies.10
Second, the creation of constitutional exemptions
does not fully take into account the necessity of de-
mocratic legitimacy and accountability. Again, the
lack of a comprehensive approach towards regulato-
ry authorities creates a random mixture of provi-
sions, which only consider democratic elements to a
certain extent.11 The possibilities for the Austrian
Constitutional Court to review the overall concept
4 See Stelzer (n 3),18-31.
5 Austrian Constitution, Article 20 para. 2 and Harald Eberhard and
Konrad Lachmayer, ‘Constitutional Reform 2008 in Austria.
Analysis and Perspectives’ [2008] 2 Vienna Journal on Interna-
tional Constitutional Law 112–23.
6 See Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1; Regulation
(EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for
cross-border exchanges in electricity [2009] OJ L211/15; Regula-
tion (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas
transmission networks [2009] OJ L211/36; Directive 2009/72/EC
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity
[2009] OJ L211/55; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common
rules for the internal market in natural gas [2009] OJ L211/94.
7 Regarding the organisational part see the Austrian Energy Control
Act, Federal Law Gazette 2010/110 and, regarding the substantive
provisions, see for example the Austrian Electricity Industry and
Organization Act, Federal Law Gazette 2010/110.
8 See eg Bernhard Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsbehör-
denmodell [The Austrian Model of Regulatory Authorities]
(Springer Publishing 2010).
9 See the Austrian E-Control Act, Section 5 para 2.
10 The enactment of ordinances by the independent regulatory
commission is one example which does not fit into the constitu-
tional framework and is enacted by a constitutional provision in
the Austrian E-Control Act (Section 12 para 2).
11 For further details, see section IV below.
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are quite limited, as most of the relevant provisions
have the rank of constitutional law.12
III. From Authority to Agency
The establishment of the new Austrian energy regu-
lator, shows moreover a general development from
an administrative authority towards a European-
style agency, a development which has been stopped
halfway by the creation of a new kind of hybrid au-
thority. This hybridity relates to the following three
elements: the authority is located between national
and European law, between public and private law
and between the legislation, the executive and the ju-
diciary.
E-Control is already quite independent from the
Austrian State and collaborates intensively with Eu-
ropean institutions like the European Commission
or other European agencies like the Body of Euro-
pean Regulators for Electronic Communication
(BEREC).13 The European Commission has the pos-
sibility to influence certain procedures.14 This devel-
opment towards a European network of domestic en-
ergy agencies of the Member States has not yet been
completed, and might never be. The Austrian gov-
ernment is still appointing the members of the exec-
utive and supervisory board as well as the members
of the regulatory commission. A limited possibility
for governmental supervision still exists, although
this might be challenged by European institutions.15
The Austrian energy regulator is established un-
der public law, however its structure is based on the
organisational concept of private corporations. The
regulator is using his powers under public law, but
can also use soft law mechanisms to steer the mar-
ket. Thus, the distinction between private and pub-
lic law in the Austrian legal system becomes blurred.
EU law does not recognise such a strict distinction
between acts of public and private law.
Finally, the activities of the Austrian energy regu-
lator are traditionally understood as administrative
law. However, the regulator also has significant judi-
cial functions16 anda certain influence on legislation,
eg by drafting certain statutory amendments or by
the enactment of ordinances. As a consequence, the
activities of the regulatory authorities no longer fit
into the traditional concept of the separation of pow-
ers, instead resembling the European concept of in-
stitutional balance much more 17.
In conclusion, the European regulatory approach
has led to a significant change in the domestic con-
cept of administration. The domestic regulators are
progressing from a national authority towards a Eu-
ropean-style agency, not resulting in a European
agency, but rather in hybrid organisational bodies
fulfilling neither national nor European standards. A
consequence of this is that the energy regulator does
not fit into the framework of Austrian constitution-
al law. The Austrian solution is the development of
regulatory constitutional law. This fragmented and
incoherent legislative area creates further challenges
for constitutionalism, eg regarding democracy.
IV. Democratic Shortcomings
The European regulatory strategy fosters indepen-
dence in all its forms (institutional, functional and
financial). This development is endorsed not only by
market actors but also by state influence. Democrat-
ic legitimacy is substituted by expert knowledge and
efficiency. However, democracy constitutes a legiti-
mate aim of domestic constitutional law, which has
to be optimised within the European regulatory
frameworkonanational level.Thus, further concepts
have to be introduced into regulatory constitutional
law in Austria to guarantee European standards of
regulation on the one hand and to improve the effec-
tiveness of the democratic principle in the context of
network regulation on the other.
The independence of regulatory authorities and
their limited democratic legitimacy have to be ad-
dressed in two different ways. First, the possibilities
12 The Austrian Constitutional Court can declare constitutional law
as unconstitutional, but only in extreme cases of violations of the
basic principles of the Austrian Constitution.
13 See eg Austrian E-Control Act, section 23.
14 See Natalie Grimm, The Shift of Energy Regulatory Powers
under the Framework of Directive 2009/72/EC (PhD thesis,
Department of Law; University of Vienna 2011), 137-215,
<http://othes.univie.ac.at/16217/> accessed 10.10.2014..
15 See the ECJ’s case law with regard to the Austrian Data Protection
Authority in Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria [2012] ECR I-
00000, judgment of 16th October 2012, [42-54].
16 See Austrian E-Control Act, section 12.
17 Jörg Monar, ‘The European Union’s Institutional Balance of
Power after the Treaty of Lisbon’, in European Commission DG
Education and Culture,, ‘The European Union after the Treaty of
Lisbon: Visions of leading policy-makers, academics and journal-
ists’ (2011), 60-89. < http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/the-european-
union-after-the-treaty-of-lisbon-pbNC3110682/ > accessed
10.10.14.
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of legitimacy have to be improved, and second, the
competences of the regulatory authorities have to be
limited. It is the function of constitutional law to lim-
it governmental powers.18 The independent struc-
ture of regulatory authorities requires a constitution-
al regulatory law, which also fulfils the function of
limiting regulatory competences.
The tasks of regulatory authorities are steadily in-
creasing, with the state devolving further powers to
the regulatory bodies.19 If these regulatory authori-
ties can only offer limited democratic legitimacy and
accountability, it is necessary to limit the tasks of the
regulatory authorities to the strictly necessary pow-
ers and competences. This includes statutory limits
to the discretionary power of regulatory authorities,
which should only offer the proportionate margin of
discretion.
Moreover, effective state supervisionwouldbenec-
essary. Although the state still has many possibilities
to gain information from the regulatory agencies,20
the options for legal review and the accountability of
regulatory agencies are limited.21 Within the hybrid
concept of regulatory authorities, it is necessary to
find a new kind of domestic institutional balance be-
tween the state and the regulatory authorities. The
most important challenge – especially for smaller
countries like Austria – is the availability of knowl-
edge. The establishment of independent regulatory
authorities binds huge personal resources, because
only a limited number of persons have the relevant
expertise.Thestateauthorities,whichco-operatewith
the regulatory authorities, cannot uphold a big super-
visory body, mainly for financial reasons. The limit-
ed resources of state authorities create dependence
on the knowledge of the regulatory authority, leading
to a considerable limitation of supervisory powers.
V. Lessons to be Learned
The Austrian case shows that it is necessary for the
national legal framework to adapt its democratic
concept of administration to comply with the Euro-
pean standards of regulation. The structural influ-
ence of the European regulatory approach is signif-
icant and does not necessarily fit into domestic con-
stitutional law. The Austrian approach of creating
regulatory constitutional law which is still highly
fragmented seems to be a questionable way. A com-
prehensive and coherent approach towards a par-
ticular democratic concept for national regulatory
regimes, however, would be a reasonable possibili-
ty.
In its third energy package, the EU deals with the
limitation of state influence for reasons of increased
objectivity and efficiency.22 Nowadays, the Union is
also strengthening its attempts to secure constitu-
tional values in the Member States.23 At the same
time, the political developments foster the legitima-
cy of the European Commission. In the context of
network regulation, the Union’s legislation has to
take better account of democratic implications than
it has done up until now. Output and efficiency-ori-
ented ways of legitimacy cannot create sufficient le-
gitimacy and accountability.
Finally, the hybrid concept of domestic regulatory
authorities needs to step up on a European level of
regulatory legitimacy and accountability and the
question of democracy has also to be addressed at
this level. The dynamics of the Union’s democracy
can create a change for a strongerEuropeanapproach
towards an intensified democratic concept of regula-
tion.
18 See Andras Sajo, Limiting Government (Central European Univer-
sity Press 1999).
19 See eg a search engine for petrol stations in Austria: see
<www.spritpreisrechner.at/>, accessed 10.10.14.
20 eg Austrian E-Control Act, sections 13-6, 19, 28.
21 See Grimm (n 14), 71-135.
22 See eg Directive 2009/72/EC (n 6), Article 35.
23 See European Commission, ‘A new EU Framework to Strengthen
the Rule of Law’, COM (2014) 158 final/2.
